We test the relationship between the size of regional trade agreements (RTA) and openness by using a gravity equation with multilateral trade factors. Our sample includes eleven RTAs, seven with constant membership and four with expanding membership. Regional trade bias declines with the size of the club; three of the four expanding RTAs have already surpassed their 'optimal' size. We also explore the link between openness of the RTA and the geographic strategy of the multinational enterprise. We find strong evidence in favor of the regionalization strategy, which has been enhanced by the presence of RTAs.
INTRODUCTION
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are an integral part of the international trade system and have been since the European Economic Community was launched in 1958. Two observations stand out. The first is that RTAs have been rapidly rising in numbers and complexity (Crawford & Fiorentino, 2005) . 1 The second is that several of them have expanded in membership and in relative economic size. The European Union (EU) has grown from the original six members of The RTA phenomenon has sparked a growing literature on the role of RTAs in the international trade system; see review article by Panagariya (2000) . Our paper intends to address empirically the relationship between RTA size and trade bias and then connect different degrees of openness of the blocs to alternative expansion strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
On the first relationship, we are motivated by an old question and a new question. The old question is whether RTAs are "building" or "stumbling" blocs, where "building" means that RTAs expand world trade and "stumbling" means the opposite. 2 A pure building bloc occurs when RTA members' trade with one another in excess of the trade flows implied by a reference model and without any reduction of trade flows between members and non-members, again beyond the trade flows implied by a reference model. This corresponds to the case of trade creation without trade diversion in Viner's (1950) classic study of customs unions. If trade diversion occurs, the RTA expands world trade only if trade creation exceeds trade diversion; we may call it a weak building bloc. If trade diversion fully offsets trade creation, the RTA fully reallocates trade from outsiders to insiders; we may call it a weak stumbling bloc. If trade diversion more than fully offsets trade creation, the RTA is a pure stumbling bloc.
The new question deals with RTA expansion. Larger internal markets resulting from expanding RTAs may make it easier to implement beyond-the-border liberalization programs, as the EU did in the 1980s with its internal market initiative. Trade creation rises, but trade diversion may rise as well. Since larger RTAs tend to have a higher ratio of internal trade to GDP than smaller RTAs, the pressure to liberalize trade with non-members may decline. Not surprisingly, the EU and the United States protect sensitive sectors like agriculture and textiles where developing countries have a comparative advantage. 3 In the end, whether an expanding RTA tends to be more of a building than a stumbling bloc is an empirical issue.
On the relationship between RTAs and the activity of the MNEs, the literature seems to provide little guidance. Indeed, Dunning, Fujita, and Yakova (2007) and Buckley et al. (2001) emphasize that further research on the role of enlarged RTAs are required to understand MNE globalization and regionalization strategies and the impact of regional integration on foreign direct investment (FDI). We gain more insights from the theories of foreign direct investment, an activity predominantly undertaken by MNEs. Traditional theories underscore the substitutability between exports and FDI in an environment of declining trade costs (Brainard 1997; Markusen & Venables 2000) . Yet, the data show that these two variables have a positive correlation. Newer models try to predict complementarity between exports and FDI by focusing on the incentives of lower-cost MNEs to acquire foreign higher-cost MNEs after a liberalization program in the host country or horizontal investment abroad to exploit export opportunities in a larger economic area like a RTA (Neary, 2006 (Neary, , 2007 . In a world interlaced with RTAs, the MNE can pursue several alternative strategies: it can be global in the sense that it can operate in more than one RTA market, as well as in countries that are not affiliated to RTAs; it can be regional in the sense that the bulk of its activities is carried out inside a given RTA without a dominant domestic focus; it can be regional-domestic in the sense that the bulk of its activities takes place in the home market. The relevance of the RTA is that it conditions the environment in which the MNE operates. The more open the environment the more likely that the RTA will find it profitable to be outward looking.
Our research strategy is as follows. We first estimate the size of the regional trade bias of this GE is that trade flows, not only reflect the forces of bilateral trade barriers, but also the barriers between all other countries and a given country pair. Older GEs that ignore multilateral trade factors are fraught with an omitted variable problem and do not yield consistent and efficient estimates of trade creation and trade diversion; consequently, the empirical findings based on these older GEs have to be taken with a grain of salt (Carrère, 2006) . We will also estimate trade creation and trade diversion effects for the different sizes of four RTAs that have enlarged over the sample period. These estimates allow us to infer whether size increases have gone more in the direction of enhancing than erecting obstacles to world trade growth. We then move to firm-level behavior with an intention to show that there is a connection between the "macro" and the "micro" results. We will build an empirical model that explains the MNE's foreign activity in terms of, among other things, participation in the inside and outside-RTAs and degrees of openness of these institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. We first review the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between the size of RTAs, trade creation and trade diversion. We then formulate the gravity equation with multilateral trade factors and the main econometric issues underlying the testing of this equation. Next, we discuss the "macro" empirical findings. Next, we analyze empirically the relevance of the RTA environment for MNEs' activity with firmlevel data. The final section is dedicated to concluding comments.
SIZE OF RTA, TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION
In this section we review the essential theoretical literature that relates to our topic of the relationship between RTA size and global trade, as well as some of the empirical literature on the trade creation and trade diversion effects due to RTAs.
Krugman (1991) examines the trade effects of an expansion in the size of trading blocs.
His point of departure is an exogenous number of RTAs of equal size, which set tariffs non-
cooperatively. An increase in the size of the blocs produces a classic combination of trade creation and trade diversion. The enlarging RTAs divert trade partly because some of the trade between blocs occurs now within the blocs and partly because these charge a higher external tariff. Welfare level is described by a U-shaped function in the number of RTAs. A single RTA in the world does best because it promotes global free trade; many RTAs do well because they have small power and levy low tariffs; and an intermediate number of RTAs produces the worst outcome. Trade diversion occurs if instead the tariffs are set cooperatively. Bond and Syropoulos (1996) relax Krugman's assumption of symmetric blocs and obtain that a bloc has an incentive to enlarge because by expanding it can increase welfare for its members above the free trade level.
A more ambiguous case for RTAs comes from Yi's (1996) however, they can become stumbling blocs when the decision to enlarge requires unanimity. Andriamananjara (1999) develops a model of endogenous RTAs from a setting in which each national market has a single firm and is perfectly segmented, yet all firms produce perfectly substitutable goods. RTAs expand because firms make higher profits in a larger RTA than in a smaller RTA; clearly, insiders must allow the expansion. A larger club has two effects. The first is the noted positive effect on profits due to a larger market with preferential treatment. The profit effect, however, declines as the RTA enlarges because the oligopoly power of each firm declines with RTA size. The second effect is that the formation of an RTA reduces the profits of the outsiders, which have an incentive to join the RTA. The optimal size of the club is not the world because insiders have an interest in restraining membership.
On the empirical side, Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1996) estimate a bilateral trade GE for 63 countries for the period 1965-1992 and find positive and statistically significant regional trade biases and a mixture of trade creation and trade diversion effects. Soloaga and Winters (2001) estimate a GE for 58 countries for the period 1980-1996, separating import from export trade diversion effects. Unlike Frankel et al. (1996) , they do not find statistically significant regional trade biases, but uncover import and export trade diversion for the EU and EFTA. Latin American RTAs, on the other hand, expanded total imports. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) detect trade diversion effects in the EU: the annual growth of trade between member countries and industrial non-member countries fell by 1.7 percentage points over 1956 -1973 . Crawford and Laird (2001 analyze trade data from six RTAs and find that for the period 1990-1999 the average annual growth of imports from non-members is slightly smaller than the average annual growth of insiders' imports.
It is worth repeating that empirical work based on old GEs -those that ignore multilateral trade factors-may be unreliable. Carrère (2006) , after correcting for possible econometric misspecifications of the GE (which will be discussed in the next section), finds that her sample of seven RTAs generates a mixture of trade creation and trade diversion effects. In particular, regional trade biases, over the period 1962 to 1996, were increasing through the expansion phases of the EU, MERCOSUR and NAFTA, accompanied often by a decline of imports from and exports to outsiders. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) adopt a research similar to Carrère's (again, see next section) and find strong evidence of the RTA average contribution to expand member countries' trade. Their paper, however, neither sorts out trade creation from trade diversion effects nor explores the marginal contribution of RTA size to bilateral imports.
THE GRAVITY EQUATION AND ECONOMETRIC ISSUES
It is now accepted that bilateral trade flows are best explained by the GE; see, among others, Bergstrand (1985: 474) , Leamer and Levinsohn (1995: 1384) , Deardorff (1998: 7) , and Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose. (2001: 431) . The GE has been derived from different models of international trade, ranging from models of complete specialization and identical consumers' preferences (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Deardorff, 1998) to models of product differentiation in a regime of monopolistic competition (Helpman, 1987) to hybrid models of different factor proportions and product differentiation (Bergstrand, 1989) to models of incomplete specialization and trading costs (Haveman & Hummels, 2004) . For this paper, we rely on the formulation by AvW.
In the AvW setting, countries enjoy complete specialization and consumers have homothetic preferences. 4 Country i produces good i at price p i . In country j, the good is sold at price p ij = p i ( 1 + t ij ), where t ij imbeds a host of trade costs including transport and transaction costs, regime costs arising from differences in legal systems and practices, languages, networks, competitive policies, and monetary regimes, and tariffs or tariff-equivalent restrictions aimed at discriminating against foreign producers. These costs are, for the most part, non-observable and are proxied by physical distance, cultural distance and institutional distance. Thus, countries that are geographically distant face a higher t ij than contiguous pairs; countries that speak the same language and have common roots face a lower t ij than pairs with heterogeneous cultural background; countries that share the same currency and the same central bank face a lower t ij than nations with different currencies and central banks; and finally countries that belong to the same RTA face lower t ij than countries that do not. Bilateral trade flows are determined as follows (see AvW, eq. 9):
(1) x ij = y i y j /y w (t ij /P i P j ) 1-σ , where x ij = exports from country i to country j, y = income, the subscript w = world, σ = the elasticity of substitution coefficient, P = the consumer price level. P i and P j stand for the multilateral trade costs in the AvW model and are a function of all t ij pairs, countries' income shares and countries' price levels. For σ > 1, bilateral trade flows rise (fall) if multilateral trade costs rise (fall) relative to bilateral trade costs. P i and P j are jointly determined and their omission creates a bias in the estimated coefficients.
The testable equation of (1) is: (2) ln(x ijt ) = α 0 + α 1 ln(y i y j ) t + α 2 ln(I i I j ) t + α 3 ln(d ij ) + α 4 CC ijt + α 5 ln P i + α 6 ln P j +
The new terms are as follows. I is per capita income; d is distance; CC is a vector of dummy variables that capture various types of cost-reducing affinities shared by the pair of countriessuch as common border, common language, common colonizer, common relationship and common currency-; the three RTA variables capture trade creation and trade diversion effects generated by the RTA and are discussed fully below; a t is a time effect common to all country pairs; and u ijt = μ ij + ε ijt , where μ ij is either a fixed or random unobserved bilateral effect and ε ijt is the residual error term. It should be noted that (2) descends directly from (1). The per capita income emerges from (1) through the countries' income shares that influence the two price levels; these income shares are proxied by population.
Trade creation and trade diversion effects and RTA size
In the GE literature, trade creation and trade diversion effects generated by RTAs have been typically modeled by two dummy variables: Same-RTA, which is equal to one when both countries in the pair belong to the same RTA and zero otherwise, and Im-RTA, which is equal to one when the import country belongs to the RTA and the export country does not and zero otherwise; for more details, see Soloaga and Winters (2001) . Pure trade creation is implied by β 1 > 0 and β 2 = 0. An expanding RTA that has those empirical characteristics can be said to have moved in the direction of an optimal size and to have raised welfare. If β 2 is negative, trade diversion emerges and the case for RTA depends on the relative numerical size of the positive β 1 and negative β 2 . An expanding RTA moves weakly in the "good" direction, towards an optimal size, if the positive β 1 is numerical larger than the negative β 2 . Pure trade diversion occurs when β 2 is equal to β 1 ; the expanding RTA, in this case, has moved in the "wrong" direction. Soloaga and Winters (2001) point out that this two-dummy approach ignores the effect of the RTA on non-members' exports and the possibility that RTA members can gain at the expense of non-members. 5 These authors propose a third dummy, Ex-RTA, which is equal to one when the export country belongs to the RTA and the import country does not, and zero otherwise. With a three-dummy approach, the assessment of whether an expanding RTA is moving in the right or wrong direction depends, not only on the relative numerical size of β 1 and β 2 , but also of β 1 and β 3 . Carrère (2006) adopts the Soloaga-Winters three-dummy approach.
The biggest challenge in estimating (2) is to make sure that one captures the multilateral trade factors; otherwise, the error term of the regression will imbed the effects of the variables that determine the two sets of prices and will create a bias in the other coefficients of the regression. AvW (pp. 179-180) solve the problem by estimating with nonlinear least squares a simultaneous system of equations for cross-section data. van Wincoop (2001) and Feenstra (2003) propose the use of country fixed effects, but this alternative is only applicable to cross-section data. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) discuss pitfalls of panel estimation in the presence of multilateral trade factors. These authors dismiss the use of country fixed effects because they fail to take into account that P i and P j vary over time. They recommend instead country-pair fixed effects, as well as separate time fixed effects, to capture all pairwise idiosyncratic characteristics. In sympathy with AvW's approach, an earlier study by Bikker (1987) had already pointed out that a simple GE cannot correctly estimate trade creation and trade diversion due to restrictions on the degree of substitution ( σ in (1)); Bikker estimates these substitution effects for import and export countries with a simultaneous equation model.
Since country fixed effects in the GE estimates imbed that each country-pair has its own degree of substitution, Bikker's model becomes a special case of the country-pair effect GE. 6 Carrère (p.
231) accepts that country-pair fixed effects yield unbiased estimates of time-varying variables, but this model has the drawback of eliminating time-invariant variables. The alternative is to estimate country-pair effects as random variables. We will estimate equation (2) under the two alternatives of fixed and random country-pair effects, in addition to fixed year effects. We will compare the two models and test the null hypothesis that the fixed effects model is not better than the random effects model. If the null cannot be rejected, we will then use the random model to infer trade creation and trade diversion effects of RTAs.
Finally, there is the issue of endogenous RTAs. In the theory section, we have referred to models where the selection of RTAs is determined endogenously by the models. Baier and Bergstrand (2002) report that it is difficult to identify economic and political variables that influence the formation of RTAs. In their empirical work these authors obtain unstable estimates and resort to the assumption that the RTA phenomenon moves slowly relative to trade flows; any potential endogeneity bias can be attenuated with panel estimation. Carrère endogenizes RTAs with an instrumental variable technique applied to panel data. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) return to the theme of endogeneity and propose various econometric solutions; their preferred one is a GE estimated on first-differenced panel data with fixed country-pair effects. We have done similar testing and found no significant difference between the "exogenous" and the "endogenous" specification. 7 The focus of this study and space constraints are not suitable for us to elaborate on these findings, but we will provide them to interested readers upon request. In sum, based on the principle of parsimony we will report and draw inferences only from the "exogenous" specification of RTAs.
DATA
We briefly discuss our data here and invite the interested reader to check the Indiana University CIBER Website (http://www.kelley.iu.edu/ciber/research.cfm) and Appendix 1 for more details.
Our data set consists of 215,500 annual observations covering 143 countries over the with a common currency 0.9 per cent; and those belonging to the same RTA 2.6 per cent. Table   1 shows descriptive statistics for the three RTA dummy variables for the 11 separate agreements.
Sample averages for these dummies tend to be relatively low for ASEAN7 (read ASEAN with 7 members), CARCOM 11, NAFTA2, and EU9, and relatively high for SPARTECA, EU12 and E15, with the averages reflecting the size and time length of RTA.
[ Table 1 goes about here]
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Estimates of (2), with both fixed and random country-pair effects and fixed year effects, are reported in Table 2 . The R squares are high by the standards of the GE equations estimated in the literature but are comparable to those reported by Carrère (2006, Table 2 ). Most coefficients, with the exception of those involving RTA dummies, are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. In the fixed effects model, the impact of income on bilateral imports is in line with prediction, but the impact of per capita income is not. Time-invariant dummy variables are made redundant by the estimation of the fixed effects model. The alternative of random country-pair effects passes the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM test and the Hausman (1978) test that the fixed effects model is not better than the random effects model. Therefore, we will concentrate on the random effects model for the remainder of our discussion.
The estimated αs of the random effects model of equation (2) appear to be in line with those reported in the literature. The per capita income variable has the predicted sign, in contrast to the fixed model. The size of the elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to income is less than one; the elasticity with respect to distance is numerically larger than one and confirms to be a powerful force in the gravity equation; geographical proximity and cultural affinity variables enhance trade. Countries that share a common currency do not trade any more than those that have different currencies (the coefficient of common currency is not different from zero at the 10 per cent significance level). This result may be surprising given that Rose (2000) has reported that countries with a common currency trade three times as much as countries with different currencies (and fluctuating exchange rates). However, Rose's (2000) finding has been met with skepticism from the start; see the comments to Rose by Persson (2001) . From the viewpoint of this paper, the serious problem with Rose's GE equation is the omission of multilateral trade factors. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) focus on Rose's finding to demonstrate the distortion that such an omission can create. To check on this point, when we estimated (2) with fixed importing-country (instead of fixed country-pair effects) and year effects, the coefficient of common currency turned out to be 0.62 and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
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[ Table 2 goes about here]
Non-expanding RTAs
Having disposed of the general characteristics of the estimated GE, we can now concentrate on the impact of RTAs on bilateral trade flows. We recall that our sample includes 11 RTAs, of which four have expanded at least once since 1980. We consider first the non-expanding RTAs.
SPARTECA is the pristine example of a pure building bloc towards global free trade, with a strong regional trade bias accompanied by expansion of imports and exports to the rest of the world. ANDEAN as well is a building bloc, although weaker than SPARTECA: it has a sizeable regional trade bias and a small import trade diversion. 9 USIS has a positive regional trade bias but also a fully offsetting import trade diversion; there is also some evidence of export trade diversion. 10 Therefore, USIS is a pure trade diversion case and an obstacle to global free trade.
The remaining four non-expanding RTAs -ANZCERTA, CACM, MERCOSUR, and PATCRAshow evidence of trade diversion, either on the import or the export side, and no evidence of positive regional trade bias; they too must be classified as stumbling blocs. In sum, of the seven non-expanding RTAs covered by our sample, only two have behaved as building blocs.
Expanding RTAs
Of the remaining four RTAs, ASEAN, CARICOM and the EU have expanded three times during our sample period and NAFTA only once. ASEAN is the perfect example of an expanding building bloc. In each successive enlargement, a strong and statistically very significant positive regional trade bias has been matched by an equally strong expansion of imports and exports to the rest of the world. Judged exclusively in terms of the size of the regional trade bias, ASEAN seems to have peaked with a membership of nine; see Table 3 .
The EU can also be considered a building bloc, although weaker than ASEAN. EU9 has a marginally significant positive regional trade bias and has expanded imports and exports to the rest of the world. EU10 is not statistically different from EU9. With both EU12 and EU15, the regional trade bias remains positive but declines relative to EU9 (see Table 3 NAFTA can also be judged a building bloc, comparable to the EU but weaker than ASEAN. NAFTA2 created no regional trade bias but expanded imports from the rest of the world. NAFTA3 has a strong positive regional trade bias and import expansion but diverts exports from the rest of the world. Overall, trade creation exceeds trade diversion and this RTA makes a contribution to global free trade (see Table 3 ).
CARICOM is a classic case of an expanding RTA with a positive regional trade bias achieved at the expense of trade with the outside world. Positive internal biases are present in CARICOM11, CARICOM12, and CARICOM13; they disappear in CARICOM14. Export trade diversion appears consistently through all the expansion phases, whereas import expansion is marginally significant in three out of the four bloc sizes. Clearly, CARICOM14 is a stumbling bloc and a worse outcome for global free trade than when it was smaller (see Table 3 ).
In sum, the four expanding RTAs have done better for global free trade than the seven static RTAs. ASEAN is the champion of building blocs; the EU and NAFTA have, on balance, contributed to the expansion of world trade; and CARICOM, in its present size, is a stumbling bloc. For ASEAN, the EU, and CARICOM regional trade bias has declined with size (see Table   3 ).
[ Table 3 goes about here]
RTAs AND MNE STRATEGIES
In this section, we link the relative openness of the RTAs to the activities of the MNEs, the intent being of drawing a parallelism between the macro findings and firm-level behavior. have declined in the era of globalization, traditional theory predicts an expansion of exports relative to FDI. Instead, the two variables have behaved as complements rather than as substitutes. Neary (2006 Neary ( , 2007 provides two theoretical arguments for the complementarity findings. The first is that in response to a liberalization in the foreign country, lower-cost firms in the home country not only expand their exports but also acquire high-cost firms in the foreign country. Thus, exports and FDI outflows move in the same direction. The second, partly related to the first, is that liberalization in the foreign country induces home country's firms to make horizontal investments in the foreign country as an export launching pad. The latter is particularly relevant when the liberalizing foreign country is an RTA, and even more so when the RTA has an active program of creating a single market within its confines (as it is true for the EU).
Combining the "new" theory of FDI with our macro findings on RTAs, we can make the following three predictions about MNEs' strategy. First, the costs borne by a MNE in setting and operating an affiliate abroad depend partly on firm-specific attributes (FSAs), partly on industry specific characteristics and partly on whether the host country belongs to an RTA. FSAs such as firm size, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, price competitiveness, leverage, and market growth have been identified in the literature as important characteristics that affect MNE performance: see, among others, Christophe (1997) , Kim and Lyn (1987) , Lu and Beamish (2004) , and Morck and Yeung (1991) . Other things the same, foreign activities of MNEs will be higher the higher the levels of these FSAs. Second, a MNE, after accounting for FSAs and country specific effects, will expand its activities in the member countries of its own RTA in preference to expanding activities in non-member countries. This preference will rise the larger the size of the RTA (market size) and the more liberal is the RTA environment. Buckley et al.
note that RTAs provide an opportunity to enjoy the advantages of native and adopted home market of RTAs. We call this strategy the regionalization strategy. Third, distance weakens the strength of FSAs, a result that mirrors the effect of distance on exports. This puts a severe constraint on a globalization strategy, as has been evidenced by Rugman and Verbeke (2004) and Ghemawhat (2007) . It follows that the MNE's propensity to expand operations in culturally, economically and institutionally different and more physically distant countries, for a given level of openness, will be, smaller than the propensity to expand in its own RTA.
To test these predictions, we run the following panel regression where y ijt denotes the share of sales or share of assets at time t located in the jth RTA (either the inside RTA or outside RTA) of the ith firm; FSA is a vector that includes the six firm-specific attributes mentioned above; MKTSIZE is the relative size of the market; RTA is a dummy that is equal to one if the firm is headquartered in an RTA member country and zero otherwise; NAFTA, EU15, and EU25 are dummies that are equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a member country of the specific RTA and zero otherwise; γ t is a year fixed effect common to all MNEs' shares; and δ ijt is the sum of a fixed industry effect and a residual error term.
The selected firms originating from NAFTA, EU, and three non-RTA countriesNorway, Switzerland, and Turkey-are part of the largest 500 firms listed in the Fortune Global 500 and comparable number of public firms originating ASEAN countries. More details on the data are available in Appendix 4, which shows the precise empirical definition of the variables in (3), and in Appendix 5, which presents summary statistics and the correlation matrix.
Estimates of (3) are displayed in Table 4 . The single most important finding is the corroboration that a RTA provides a favorable environment for the MNE to pursue a regionalization strategy. The RTA coefficient, in the first column of Table 4 , is positive, very statistically significant and economically relevant. MNEs from RTA countries have a fourpercentage point higher sales ratio in the rest of their own RTA than MNEs from non-RTA countries; and the result appears to be homogeneous with respect to the three RTAs in the sample.
Looking at the findings from the asset ratio (column three of Table 4 ), the RTA regionalization is corroborated only for NAFTA MNEs, and it is economically much weaker than for the sales ratio. The second most important finding is that MNEs from RTAs do not expand in other RTAs relative to non-RTA MNEs. In fact, the RTA coefficient of column two of the table suggests that
MNEs from RTA countries have almost a two-percentage point lower sales ratio in "outside"
RTAs than non-RTA MNEs. This result is not homogeneous. RTAs can be ranked as follows in terms of access: EU15 is preferred to EU25 and ASEAN, and these three are preferred to NAFTA. 12 The ranking is broadly consistent with our macro findings. The assets ratio regressions are in line with the sales ratio regressions. The other significant findings of Table 4 pertain to the relevance of FSAs in determining the external expansion strategy of MNEs. Firm size, R&D intensity, and leverage appear to be positive attributes for external expansion, and in half of the cases interact negatively with the RTA dummy. Strong FSAs, in particular firm size for sales, lead MNEs to expand beyond RTA boundaries. The other FSAs do not emerge as statically significant drivers. In sum, firm-level behavior points to a strong RTA regionalization strategy.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Two main conclusions emerge from this paper, one "macro" and one "micro." The macro conclusion is that RTAs have produced a mixed record with respect to the important issue of whether they enhance or hamper freer trade in the world. The micro conclusion is that the RTA environment has fostered a regionalization strategy of MNEs.
On the macro findings, we recall that seven of the eleven RTAs considered in this paper have kept a constant membership and four have enlarged at least once during our sample period.
In The evidence presented in the paper has some bearing on the optimal size of the RTA. Our study has focused on the relationship between RTA size and trade expansion. To the extent that countries form new RTAs or join existing ones for other reasons -such as security or political issues-we would not expect a predictable relationship between size and openness.
Indeed, political economy considerations complicate matters in the sense that import tradediverting RTAs may be more politically acceptable than trade-creating RTAs because the former do not hurt domestic industry, whereas the latter do by replacing domestic production with production located in the members' countries (Krishna 1998).
The micro finding that the RTA environment has fostered the multinational enterprise's regionalization strategy is consistent with a growing body of evidence uncovered in the IB literature. The limits to globalization may stem from the rising costs the MNE faces as adaptation takes place in more distant locations. A host of factors may contribute to these costs, economic as well as cultural. Indeed, it is tempting to draw the similarity between the role of distance on trade flows and the role of distance on the propensity to adapt by the MNE. This topic is worthy of further research. Another aspect of the research that needs more empirical work has to do with the type of environment that best suits the MNE. Our regionalization results appear to be consistent with the MNE being more capable of exploiting markets' similarities than differences.
The newer theory of FDI, with its emphasis on horizontal FDI serving as an export platform for a larger area, stresses similarities. Yet, there may be large profit opportunities by exploiting differences across industries. The data set, unfortunately, did not permit to discriminate between horizontal and non-horizontal foreign assets, a prerequisite in determining the best economic environment of the MNE. It will be part of our future research agenda. Our work has measured MNE performance either by shares of sales or shares of assets in host RTAs relative to total sales or assets, and not by relative profitability. What needs to be ascertained is whether relative sales or relative assets are good proxies of relative rates of return on capital; otherwise, the MNE is trading off one for the other.
The power of the home RTA in influencing the regionalization strategy of the RTA-based MNE can also be seen by the higher propensity of non-RTA MNEs to expand in other RTAs.
This could be due to the strong comparative advantage that the MNE develops in expanding in the home RTA, perhaps precluding the development of those firm-specific resources that make a MNE truly global. Future work, both theoretical and empirical, will have to consider what firmlevel resources alter the regional propensity of the MNE. The institutional perspective (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) suggests that home RTAs provide relatively similar institutional settings that enhance organizational legitimacy without imposing the burden of substantive changes in MNEs' structures and processes. Other approaches can give insights on how MNEs gain internalization benefits in the home RTA market, such as the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1981) and internalization theory (Rugman, 1981) . Table 2 .
a Test for equality of regional trade bias coefficients before and after expansion of RTA. P-values indicate probabilities of the chi-square that the coefficients are different from each other.
b Test for equality of coefficients of export and import trade diversion. Rejection means that country's trade orientation differs between exports and imports. 
